The legal intersection of an individual’s long-term integration into the UK and the State’s interest in denying permanent settlement on the grounds of past criminality is complex and conflicted. A recent decision of the Court of Appeal (CoA) highlights a profound structural question: can the Secretary of State repeatedly rely on the precise same historical criminal conviction to deny indefinite leave to remain (ILR) to an applicant who has completed their designated probationary period of discretionary leave (DL), or does the "presumption of settlement" require a new, intervening factor to displace the norm?
Background:
The dispute centred on an application for ILR submitted by Mr. Jimoh, a Nigerian national born in 1985. Having entered the UK as a young child in 1990 to join his father, his subsequent life in the UK was marked by severe medical hardships, including a Hepatitis B diagnosis and the surgical removal of a kidney. Mr. Jimoh was initially granted ILR on 17 February 2001.
However, following a 2006 conviction for possession of Class A drugs with intent to supply and a subsequent 30-month custodial sentence, the Secretary of State served him with a Deportation Order in 2008, thereby invalidating his ILR. Mr. Jimoh successfully appealed the deportation on Article 8 human rights grounds in 2010. He was consequently granted an initial three-year period of DL under the pre-2012 Immigration Framework. When major policy changes occurred in July 2012, transitional arrangements were enacted to ensure that individuals first granted leave under the legacy policy would continue to be evaluated under that framework through to final settlement. Mr. Jimoh’s limited DL was subsequently renewed in 2013, 2017, and 2021. During this period, he fathered a child, D, who retains a statutory right to register as a British citizen if either parent secures ILR before she turns 18.
On 3 October 2023, Mr. Jimoh applied for ILR based on his long residence. The Secretary of State refused the settlement application ("Decision 1") and instead granted a further three-year extension of limited DL ("Decision 2"), prompting Mr. Jimoh to initiate judicial review proceedings. Following Home Office reconsiderations, the matter culminated in "Decision 4" on 23 September 2025, where the Secretary of State maintained her refusal of settlement, citing Mr. Jimoh's 2006 conviction as the primary justification for withholding ILR.
In the Administrative Court, Obi J quashed "Decision 4" and issued a mandatory order requiring the Home Secretary to grant Mr. Jimoh ILR, ruling that the Home Office could not continuously re-label a known, historical conviction to deny settlement without a fresh adverse factor intervening. The Secretary of State appealed both the interpretation of the policies and the mandatory remedy to the CoA.
Decision:
The CoA arrived at a split decision, dismissing the Secretary of State's appeal on the substantive interpretation of immigration policies (Ground 1) but allowing it regarding the judicial remedy (Ground 2). Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing, delivering the leading judgement, carefully demarcated the boundary between correcting an executive error and usurping executive power.
Addressing Ground 1, the Court evaluated the "transitional arrangements" of the Home Office’s DL Policy ("Policy 3"), which mandate that individuals granted leave under the legacy of the pre-2012 policy will normally continue under that framework through to settlement. The Secretary of State argued that the word "normally" preserved an expansive discretion to repeatedly cite Mr. Jimoh's 2006 drug conviction as a ground to withhold settlement, even though that offence had been common knowledge during previous limited leave renewals. The CoA rejected the Home Office's interpretation. Applying principles from R (Ellis) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Court noted that, while the term "normally" preserves flexibility, a departure from the settlement pathway requires a rational justification grounded in a novel development, such as a conviction occurring since the matter was last considered. As the Home Office had full knowledge of Mr. Jimoh's criminal history prior to every extension granted since 2010 and thus acknowledged that he had not re-offended, any reliance on this static, historical conviction constituted a material error of law.
However, the CoA fundamentally agreed with the Secretary of State on Ground 2, ruling that the Trial Judge had erred by issuing a mandatory order that forced the executive to grant ILR. Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing emphasised that this case did not involve a breach of an unqualified, absolute statutory duty, making it entirely distinct from the Supreme Court precedent in R (Imam) v Croydon London Borough Council. Instead, the matter concerned a statutory power under Section 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, which remains subject to the Secretary of State's published policies.
Implications:
This decision provides a powerful shield for individuals relying on transitional protections or legacy policies. It establishes that, when a government agency sets up a structured pathway and repeatedly renews an individual's temporary status with full awareness of their background, it cannot arbitrarily rely on those identical historical facts at the final hurdle to block permanent status. For potential clients, this means that once the state has effectively "condoned" a past mistake by continuously granting limited permissions, it cannot endlessly revive that single historical factor to disrupt an established path to settlement unless a novel, negative development occurs.
The ruling also draws a firm constitutional line regarding which remedies can be obtained through the judicial system. It serves as a vital reminder to prospective litigants that winning a public law challenge against a government decision does not necessarily mean that the court can automatically hand down a desired final benefit or status. As the judiciary respects the constitutional separation of powers, its role remains strictly supervisory, except in those rare cases involving absolute, unqualified statutory duties. In such instances, a court will confine its remedy to quashing the unlawful administrative decision and sending it back to the relevant government department to be decided under the correct legal criteria.
Ultimately, for those clients involved in high-stakes disputes with public authorities, this ruling emphasises that their adopted legal strategy must focus on forcing a lawful, rational exercise of executive discretion rather than expecting the Court to step in and act as the primary decision-maker. However, this judgement nonetheless guarantees procedural fairness and continuity of policy while preserving the executive’s ultimate right to administer its statutory powers.